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Public involvement in constitution making is increasingly considered to be essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process. It is also becoming more widespread, spurred on by constitutional advisors and the international community. Yet we have remarkably little empirical evidence of the impact of participation on outcomes. This essay examines hypotheses on the effect of one aspect of public participation in the constitution-making process—ratification— and surveys available evidence. We find some limited support for the optimistic view about the impact of ratification on legitimacy, conflict, and constitutional endurance. ; Government

Abstract Citizens in many US states and cities in recent years have pushed for various reforms of voting methods. This raises the important question of which reform will best meet both normative and practical goals of representative democracy. While also evaluating criticisms of it, we make the case in this article that approval voting is the simplest actionable response. More specifically, we argue that approval voting offers distinct advantages, not only relative to the status quo of plurality voting, but also relative to alternative reforms. By giving voters the ability to support multiple candidates equally, approval voting grants true agency to the electorate to select strong winners among a candidate pool that is more competitive, diverse, and responsive to what voters want. As a low-cost yet high-impact electoral reform, the implementation of approval voting can create meaningful and lasting improvements in the quality of representation and policies.

This research analyzes county-level support for the 2002 Constitutional Amendments for Voluntary Universal Prekindergarten Education (VPK) and Florida's Amendment to Reduce Class Size (CSA). Three regression models are constructed for each dependent variable (support for VPK and support for CSA): a bivariate model with political party, a full model with all theoretically identified variables, and a best model with just the independent variables that have the most explanatory power. A variety of socioeconomic, demographic and political independent variables are tested. Four independent variables had a statistically significant positive relationship with support for both VPK and CSA: Democratic registration, Hispanic population, higher education, and population density. ; 2017-05-01 ; B.A. ; College of Sciences, Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

An argument for an election reform called "approval voting," which would permit voters to approve of or cast votes for as many candidates as they want in multicandidate elections. The problem posed by multicandidate elections is that a candidate can win a plurality election, or qualify for a runoff, with support from only a small % of the electorate; eg, in the 1977 New York City mayoral election, 80% of the electorate voted for candidates other than the winner. Under the present system, the winner is frequently a weaker candidate than one or more of the losers. Approval voting could ameliorate this situation by: (1) giving voters more flexible options, (2) increasing voter turnout, (3) helping elect the strongest candidate, & (4) giving minority candidates their proper due. Approval voting could easily be incorporated into existing voting-machine systems, & would require only a statutory, not a constitutional, change in most jurisdictions. The prospects for adoption of approval voting are discussed. An illustration is provided showing how approval voting could have changed the results of NH's 1980 presidential primaries. Modified Author Summary.

Several major constitutional problems were presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court during the survey year. There were no startling developments in the court's disposition of these cases, nor in the opinions proclaimed in each instance. The court avoided what it termed a "spectacular exhibition of judicial sophistry" in giving constitutional approval to certain activities of a religious nature in the public schools. In the regulation of economic affairs the court found no valid basis for a statute prohibiting the offering of benefits or premiums in connection with the sale of gasoline. Basic allocations of governmental power were involved in a case in which the court denied a petition by the Bar Association of Tennessee that it adopt a rule of court integrating the bar of the state. The opinion in this instance weighed the expediency of the proposal and did not rest its decision upon any finding of lack of inherent power in the court to promulgate such a rule. The opinion is of great importance in showing how judicial power may supplement legislative power in prescribing requirements for admission to the bar.

364States — Conduct of foreign relations — Deployment of armed forces — Nuclear weapons — United States medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads — Declaration by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Federal Republic of Germany consenting to deployment on German territory within framework of NATO — Whether declaration binding under international law — Whether such unilateral international act subject to parliamentary legislative approval under Articles 24(1) and 59(2) of Basic Law of Federal Republic — Whether such deployment covered by previous legislative approval of founding NATO treaties — Whether deployment constituting fundamental change in previously agreed NATO programme for collective defenceStates — Conduct of foreign relations — Transfer of sovereign powers — Constitutional limitations — Requirement of parliamentary legislative approval — Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany, Article 24(1) — Deployment of United States nuclear weapons on territory of Federal Republic within framework of NATO — Whether constituting transfer of sovereign powers to international organization — Relevance of fact that United States President having final right of decision over use of weapons — Whether constituting transfer of sovereignty to foreign State — Whether United States President acting as organ of NATOWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Collective self-defence — North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 5(1) — Division of responsibilities between NATO institutions and Member States — Decision by Member States in 1979 to "modernize" defence systems and deploy medium-range nuclear weapons on their territories — Whether decision taken by Member States within framework of existing treaty commitments — Weapons — Nuclear weapons — Law relating to weaponryInternational organizations — North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Legal status — Whether constituting an international organization under Article 24(1) of Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 5(1) — Effect of provisions preserving certain powers of decision to Member States — Whether Treaty providing for integration of common defence forces — Deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons by Member States — Whether falling within previously agreed framework for integration365International organizations — Definition — Whether such organizations must be endowed with power to enact directly applicable rules — Whether transfer of powers from Member States must be irrevocable — Whether founding treaty must expressly provide for a clearly defined process of integrationTreaties — Conclusion and operation — Constitutional limitations — Treaties regulating political relations — Requirement of parliamentary legislative approval — Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany, Article 59(2) — Whether legislative approval required only for treaties or also for international acts performed within the framework of an existing treatyTreaties — Interpretation — Multilateral treaty — Interpretation subject to provisions of previous multilateral treaty — Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968 — Interpretation of provisions on nuclear weapons in the light of Article 51 of United Nations Charter — The law of the Federal Republic of Germany

This article explores the gaps left by the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in relation to what the appropriate internal appeal mechanism should be at the level of municipalities for the approval of building plans. This follows the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National Building Regulations Review Board 2018 5 SA 1 (CC) in which the Court found section 9 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBR Act), subjecting municipal building decisions to appeal by a "Review Board" appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, to be inconsistent with the original constitutional powers of municipalities over planning and building regulations. We argue that although the ground for holding section 9 of the NBR Act unconstitutional is already deeply entrenched in the Court's planning jurisprudence, the judgment has left a whopping gap on where prospective/future appeals can be lodged and the nature of such an appeal mechanism, where municipal officials disapprove building plans in terms of section 7 of the NBR Act. It is submitted that the invalidation of section 9 by the Court has completely left it up to each individual municipality to decide on whether and how an internal appeal for the approval of building plans is to be pursued. After exploring the options available in terms of other local government legislation, we argue that the most appropriate way to close the gap left by the Court is for Parliament to enact an amendment to the NBR Act providing for an internal appeal mechanism that allows for a measure of coherence and uniformity across municipalities, and yet respects the autonomy of local government.

This article explores the gaps left by the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in relation to what the appropriate internal appeal mechanism should be at the level of municipalities for the approval of building plans. This follows the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National Building Regulations Review Board 2018 5 SA 1 (CC) in which the Court found section 9 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBR Act), subjecting municipal building decisions to appeal by a "Review Board" appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, to be inconsistent with the original constitutional powers of municipalities over planning and building regulations. We argue that although the ground for holding section 9 of the NBR Act unconstitutional is already deeply entrenched in the Court's planning jurisprudence, the judgment has left a whopping gap on where prospective/future appeals can be lodged and the nature of such an appeal mechanism, where municipal officials disapprove building plans in terms of section 7 of the NBR Act. It is submitted that the invalidation of section 9 by the Court has completely left it up to each individual municipality to decide on whether and how an internal appeal for the approval of building plans is to be pursued. After exploring the options available in terms of other local government legislation, we argue that the most appropriate way to close the gap left by the Court is for Parliament to enact an amendment to the NBR Act providing for an internal appeal mechanism that allows for a measure of coherence and uniformity across municipalities, and yet respects the autonomy of local government.